Objection 1. Further, as stated above (Article 4), the body of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its accidents. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body. Entdecke Aquinas' Summa Theologica (SCM kurz) - Taschenbuch NEU Daniel, David M 28. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament. Objection 3. [a] Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is "what a thing is" (De Anima iii). But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. 77: Fraud in Buying and Selling: Q. Reply to Objection 2. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. Evang. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligencethat a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. It seems, then, that it does not see Christ, as He is under the species of this sacrament. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. Objection 5. Reply to Objection 1. Reply to Objection 3. Therefore, for the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him. Objection 2. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as stated above (III:50:5). Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved until morning, will Christ's body be there; and so it is not immovably in this sacrament. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Christ's own bodily eye sees Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. And therefore those accidents of Christ's body which are intrinsic to it are in this sacrament. Reply to Objection 1. On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. Reply to Objection 3. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. According to this being, then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally, because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above (Article 5). vii, 19), that "the soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Hence it remains that Christ's body is not in this sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because the substance of Christ's body succeeds the substance of bread in this sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the substance of Christ's body. Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food, and the blood as drink. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. But when such apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven: yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But it can be seen by a wayfarer through faith alone, like other supernatural things. As the Philosopher says (Phys. Yet we must know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly, from natural concomitance. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Reply to Objection 4. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. For matter must be proportionate to the form. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2014, 454pp., $29.99 (pbk), ISBN 9780199380633. Objection 3. Further, in the resurrection the saints will be equal to the angels, according to Luke 20:36. Summa theologiae 1a 75-76 (tr. Further, man moves himself as every animal does. For Augustine says (De Qq. Text Size. Objection 2. But when flesh or a child appears, the sacramental species cease to be present. Consequently, it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body to be in this sacrament. Objection 1. 2 Treatise on the Last End (Questions 1-5) 3 Treatise on Human Acts: Acts Peculiar to Man (Questions 6-21) 4 Treatise on the Passions (Questions 22-48) 5 Treatise on Habits (Questions 49-54) 6 Treatise on Habits in Particular (Questions 55-89) 7 Treatise on Law (Questions 90-108) The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. To this end, Aquinas cites proofs for the existence of God and outlines the activities and nature of God. Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and drink, as stated above (III:74:1). I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. From which it is evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2). Now it is evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is that of bread or wine. 3 - OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES) Question. . But the glorified eye sees Christ always, as He is in His own species, according to Isaiah 33:17: "(His eyes) shall see the king in his beauty." The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. As stated above, during such apparitions Christ's proper semblance is not seen, but a species miraculously formed either in the eyes of the beholders, or in the sacramental dimensions themselves, as was said above. Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Now what is added is always more perfect. It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the species of bread and wine. There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotlenamely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Is the entire Christ under every part of the species? For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual beingfor instance, fire or air, or something of that sortmaintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. Is the whole Christ under this sacrament? Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body. Number follows division, and therefore so long as quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided into parts. Question. Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not repeated. Q.76: The Union of the Soul with the Body: Q. Are all the dimensions of Christ's body in this sacrament? If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. Reply to Objection 2. If, then, Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated separately. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect itself. Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. For if any two things be really united, then wherever the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind. lxxxiii): "Some are so foolish as to say that the mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is perpetually in it." Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament "by way of substance," and not by way of quantity. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. Question 76. I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. Question. Therefore, when such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament. But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. For since the way in which Christ is in this sacrament is entirely supernatural, it is visible in itself to a supernatural, i.e. But the part which moves is the soul. It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them, not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ's body bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through its own accidents, but through the sacramental species. Union of Soul and Body in Man 1. The First Part addresses God, gradually working its way through God's creation and the angels to man. Objection 3. Nor does it matter that sometimes Christ's entire body is not seen there, but part of His flesh, or else that it is not seen in youthful guise, but in the semblance of a child, because it lies within the power of a glorified body for it to be seen by a non-glorified eye either entirely or in part, and under its own semblance or in strange guise, as will be said later (Supplement:85:2-3). 2 (Whether angels . From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by anothersince a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonalso neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. The spiritual soul of a human being is the substantial form of the living man. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is considerably larger than the dimensive quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really exists outwardly. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. Hence since it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. But Christ's body seems to be definitively in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Reply to Objection 1. Now it is the nature of a body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is immovably in this sacrament. v). 78: The Specific Powers of the Soul: Because the change of the bread and wine is not terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. But with things which can of themselves be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise than with things which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as forms and spiritual substances. viii (Did. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. Objection 2. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. Objection 2. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. Reply to Objection 2. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty, because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread there, as stated above (III:75:2); but only the body of Christ is there. Objection 3. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each species. But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion is terminated. And not even the angelic intellect of its own natural power is capable of beholding it; consequently the devils cannot by their intellect perceive Christ in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they do not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from the evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: "The devils believe, and tremble.". ix, 10). But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Reply to Objection 1. As it is in this sacrament, can Christ's body be seen by the eye? For our eyes are hindered from beholding Christ's body in this sacrament, on account of the sacramental species veiling it. Objection 1. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. But the difference which constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain the same as before, there is a miraculous change wrought in the other accidents, such as shape, color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): "Christ is in this sacrament.". Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (Article 4). x). To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. Edus. The Summa Theologica, as its title indicates, is a "theological summary." It seeks to describe the relationship between God and man and to explain how man's reconciliation with the Divine is made possible at all through Christ. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. It is against these that Cyril says (Ep. Objection 2. And since the conversion of the substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of parts is indeed in Christ's true body, which, however, is not compared to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the manner of its substance, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3). Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained under the measure of a lesser. xxvi): "We are made partakers of the body and blood of Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself.". Edus. But the intellectual soul is one form. Secondly, because, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3; Article 3), Christ's body is substantially present in this sacrament. Reply to Objection 4. 1.1 Introduction. Reply to Objection 3. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion. Answers: 1. Objection 1. Objection 2. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. Aa Aa. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. Christ's body is not in this sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species. Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Objection 4. After the consecration, is the body of Christ moved when the host or chalice is moved? Mai 2 in groer Auswahl Vergleichen Angebote und Preise Online kaufen bei eBay Kostenlose Lieferung fr viele Artikel! It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore the entire Christ is not contained under this sacrament. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), any part of Christ is in this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament; in another, from real concomitance. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. How it is caused will be shown later on (I:117:1). 77: The Powers of the Soul in General: Q. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul. Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. For the body of Christ is indeed present under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 1) in regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of His Passion and death. Entdecke Aquinas ""Summa Theologica II"" (SCM kurz), David Mills Daniel, gebraucht; gutes Buch in groer Auswahl Vergleichen Angebote und Preise Online kaufen bei eBay Kostenlose Lieferung fr viele Artikel! I answer that, As was observed above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3), because the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the dimensive quantity of place. Yet Christ does not remain in this sacrament for all coming time. Therefore, the substance of Christ's body will be in this sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable, since the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament, only by the consecration of the bread, as stated above (Article 2). Since therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul and body, as shown above (III:2:5; III:5:3), it seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament. Objection 3. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.